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Economic Thought of IBN HAZM

LIFE HISTORY

i. Abu Muhammad ‘Ali Ibn Abu ‘Umar Ibn Ahmad Ibn Sa’id Ibn Hazm

ii. Born in 994,Cordova to a rich and influential family

iii. Descendents of Persian who had converted from Christianity and resettled in Andalusian Spain

iv. His father,Abu ‘Umar Ahmad attained a high position in the administrative hierarchy

v. He became a wazir for 3 different ocassions

vi. Attained respect as a great thinkers

vii. Proved to be forceful philologist,rhetologist,jurist,philosopher,theologician

viii. Innovative scholar and outspoken proponent of radical views that often prompted harsh criticism

The four highlighted total economic concerns during the Ibn Hazm period are:

Economic Development

i. Basic needs and Poverty

ii. Zakah

iii. Taxes

Land Tenure systems

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. Fulfillment of basic needs and poverty eradication.

a) Ibn Hazm emphasized on one of the Maqasid al-Shariah which is the preservation of human life and well being through the four basics standard of human being which are food, clothing, health and shelter.

b) The fulfillment of basic needs are essentials to protect the benefit of the human being mentally and spiritually.

c) Non-fulfillment of basic needs is the fundamental indicator of the existence of poverty.

d) Thus, Ibn Hazm also emphasized on the role of the state as well as the rich people in ensuring the needs of the needy people must be met.

2. Zakah

a) In eradicating the existence of the poverty and fulfilling the basic needs among the poor people, Ibn Hazm addressed a priority on the role of the rich by helping out the poor through the obligatory status which is zakah.

b) According to Ibn Hazm, zakah is an obligation that must be fulfilled during his/her lifetime and apart from his/her wealth must be distributed to the poor.

c) Regardless of the cause for non-payment of zakah (intentionally done, ignorance of obligation), the zakah debt is never written off and it considered as a debt to Allah SWT.

} Since zakah is one of the 5 pillars of Islam, non fulfillment of the pillar considered sin.

TAXES

a) Concerned with the factor of justice in the tax system

b) The interests of the people must be considered when imposing tax

c) Concerned over the nature of the tax system

d) Abusive and exploitative must be prevented

e) Taxes were to be collected by not transgressing the limits of the Syari’ah.

LAND TENURE

a) Holds the opinion that muzara’ah is invalid in Islamic law.

b) Ibn Hazm as a proponent of Socialist

Why Ibn Hazm so-called as socialistic tendencies:

  1. Fighting for the welfare of people in other to eradicate the poverty situation of poor and indigent by enjoining imposition of taxes on the rich.

Correction:

All what Ibn Hazm has done is just for the sake of Allah, In other to uphold the justice among the indigent and poor-The enjoyment is for the benefit of society and not for the class struggle.

2. Urging state intervention, in particular through imposition of taxes, in order to alleviate poverty.

Correction:

Yes, we cannot deny of limitation of state power in market because there is hadith regard to the market intervention. However, it is must to understand the meaning of the hadith is use for the situation at that time of prophet. But, when it goes for the maslahah of his society. Ibn hazm need to use the intervention of government because there are a lot of rich people who is greed and don’t want to pay zakat.

3. Ibn Hazm constant concern on the society need even he was came from the notable family and had held position as wazir for three time within three different ruler.

Correction:

Ibn Hazm insisting on the literal meaning of Quran(2:177/273). Ibn Hazm as a proponent of Liberalism

Why Ibn Hazm so-called as liberal tendencies and advocate liberal doctrine?

  1. Opposition against taxes and the exploitative of tax collection.

Correction:

He is not totally reject the tax but as long as zakat can sustain and satisfy the society, he will not use tax. He is concern with the maslahah of the society because at that time using too much taxes on trader or manufacturer will make loses for them.

2. His concern that non-shar’iy taxes result in loses for manufacturers, entrepreneurs and traders.

Correction:

He was concern with the welfare of manufacturer, entrepreneur and trader as he concern to the poverty and indigent-justice factor.

3. His opposition against taxes on goods since this can hinder the rate of sales and the multiplier effects accruing from elements of injection into the economy

Correction:

Some of Ibn Hazm’s struggle which hinder the flourishing of trade had been neglected.-Ibn Hazm struggles have been selected due to reflect a certain ideology’s coincidental similarity. his struggle is based on entirely different philosophical and ideological foundation. His view is focus in helping the poor people. Even the tax collection is one of the inflow surplus to the state but at his time there is a lot of chaotic and misuse of power at administrative.Besides that, there is no meaning when there is economy growth but the gap between rich and poor still wideand the poverty cannot be reduce.

The Best Of Ibn Hazm

1) He is great jurist with a unique approach because he rejected analogical reasoning as well as istihsan.

2) He is one of the greatest thinkers in the Arab-Muslim civilization.

a) Literateur(major in work of art,drama and poetry)

b) historian(major in history)

c) philologist(science or study the development of language)

d) Rhetoricist(language impresively)

e) Jurist(major in fiqh and usul fiqh)

f) Philosopher (the basic knowledge of other knowledge) and theology( understand comparitive religion and

3) He had endowed with the position of imamah.

a. Possessing personal traits such as strength and rigour of memory, sharpness in thought and words and highly commendable powers of observation and analysis.

b. Having education through his personal enthusiasm to learn and study.

c. Deep understanding in foreign languages.

d. He had active participation as a wazir. He spoke with soundness of thought and richness experiences.

4) His works comprises 400 works with 80,000 sheets but only less than 40 still exist-its encompass jurisprudence,logic,history,ethics and comparative religion.

Profit Theory: the Islamic viewpoint

ZUBAIR HASAN
Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of Economics
Zakir Husain College, University of Delhi, India.

Introduction

Much of the literature on Islamic economics in the realm of distribution has so far been mainly concerned with questions relating to interest. Rent and, at times, wages have also been discussed. But the subject of profit continues to remain in a state of almost total neglect. References to it have made occasional appearance in the discussions on mudarabah or the principles of trade. The present paper, therefore, makes a preliminary attempt to look at profit theory from the Islamic viewpoint.
Implicit in this endeavor is the recognition that there is a basic affinity between the economic scheme of Islam and the capitalistic system: for, profit as a distributive share, is extrinsic to the socialist way of thinking. Islam, like capitalism, permits private ownership of property including the means of production [1] and grants freedom of enterprise. It holds trade and therefore production in high esteem[2]. Islam is neitheropposed to competitive effort nor is averse to the operation of the market forces. Yet its theory differs from that of capitalism both in matters of thrust and content. Islam places more emphasis on mutual cooperation and social gain in relation to competition and self-seeking; it has no liberal overtones[3]. Islamic theory cannot make a segmental approach to human existence nor can it stay amoral. The social code of conduct cannot be determined or altered, as in capitalism, by the collective will of the people, it is God ordained and hence not flexible. In addition, there are vital differences on some specific issues like interest, speculation, treatment of uncertainty, and so on.

In view of this unique relationship of affinity and divergence between Islam and capitalism part one of this paper takes a rapid look at the current state of profit theory in economic science. Part two then attempts a reformulation in the light of Islamic njunctions.
The discussion is cast in general frame. The underlying assumption is that of large cale production meant for the market. The approach is theoretical; the basic frame is hat of text book economics. Factual confirmation of or departures from abstract formulations are not given weight; for there seems to be some distinct advantage in this self-imposed restraint. As there is no economic system at present run entirely in accordance with the Islamic requirement this can help us avoid the pitfall of comparing capitalist 'reality' with the 'ideal' Islamic model.
It may be mentioned here that there is one peculiar difficulty in assessing or formulating a theory concerning profit. Unlike wages, rent, or interest, profit is not a thing by itself. Being a residual category, it is vitally influenced by the manner in which these other factor rewards are determined. Excursions into the area of profit theory may sometimes necessitate the opening up of the entire distribution question.
Lastly, no finality is claimed for the observations made or the conclusions arrived at. They are presented here primarily with a view to initiate discussion and encourage debate.

Profit Theory - Some Issues

Profit plays a pivotal role in the working of free enterprise economics. Price theory, the core of economic science, can hardly stand erect if its basic assumption of profit maximization is removed, and few growth models would look neat without some profit concept. Yet to questions like what is profit, what causes, shapes or determines it, to whom does it really belong. etc., economists have failed to provide satisfactory answers.
Modern text books either do not discuss this vital subject or relegate it to some dusty corners [4] Learned discussions on profit have been few and far between. Above all, orthodoxy has not relented enough to accommodate in full measure the ramifications of the metamorphosis market economies have undergone during the past hundred years.
However, instead of discussing each profit theory as a separate unit, let us examine some of the main issues in the field. This would help save space and better focus on the prevailing confusion regarding the subject.
Profit Concept: In free enterprise economies the sum of the contractual factor payments when deducted from the revenue product of the firms leaves a surplus that goes to the entrepreneurs. This surplus is akin to the accounting gross profit. A part of it represents capital compensation which incidentally the market forces are powerless to determine. Capital compensation, however arrived at, is taken out of the gross profit to arrive at its 'net' component.
In accounting net profit the economists isolate 'implicit' returns comprising of rent, interest, wages and the risk-premium accruing to the entrepreneurs for the supply of corresponding inputs by them to the firms. Put together, these returns are called 'normal' profit which is then treated as an element of production costs. Net profit minus implicit returns gives the final surplus the so-called 'pure' profit. Monopoly revenue is often kept out of this surplus [5] on the plea that it accrues to those scarce factors on which monopoly power rests, not to the entrepreneurs. Today, economic theorists writing on the subject attempt to explain the emergence of 'pure' profit without using the adjective 'pure' any longer.
This definition of profit is too abstract and microscopic. The concept of normal profit has an ethical import. But in the real, dynamic situation normal and pure components of the surplus are extremely difficult to separate, even conceptually [6]. The same is true of monopoly revenues. Indeed, profit can be viewed only as an integrated whole having many and varied elements that are inextricably intermixed. Text book economics seems to endorse this view though one may like it to make its notion of profit a little more explicit.
Source of Profit: For explaining the emergence of profit (pure) the economists generally start with a no-profit model as the limiting case wherein the remuneration of the various factor services would exhaust the total revenue product of the firm such that profit tends to zero. These no-profit models are well known [7]. In any event, despite the differences in their range and implications, they all tend to converge, in the ultimate analysis, to the classical design of perfect competition. Undaunted by the enormous qualitative difference between situations within and outside these models, their makers search for the source of profit in what causes the failure of the ideal profitless exchange.
It is agreed that the real cause of this failure is dynamic change. But, interestingly, each economist in his attempt to formulate his theory of profit has seized upon that rudiment of dynamic change that suited his own predilections or scheme of work. Thus, for J.B. Clark and many others it was risk inherent in change. But Knight threw overboard all the risk theories of profit on the plea that risk is measurable uncertainty and can be insured against (Knight, pp.35-38, 148). Indeed, it was he who first made the risk-premium an element of the production costs. To him profit arises because of the immeasurable uncertainty - the true risk - that divides factors of production into hired and unhired ones (entrepreneurs). How this approach makes qualitative departure from the risk theories of profit is difficult to observe. But in the process Knight threw up more than one theory of profit and the profit concept or measure is not found to be the same in each case (Hasan, P.33). This apart, his analysis has been stretched to demonstrate that he could help only in identifying a windfall element resulting from the "errors of forecasting" in all the factor incomes (Weston, p.158).
Schumpeter placed emphasis on technological change, symbolized by innovations that were crucial for triggering the economy on the road to development. Innovators were his entrepreneurs and profit was their reward. (Schumpeter, 1934, Ch. IV). But as he realized that (he function of innovation had already been institutionalized he threw his notion of entrepreneurial profit into the pile of 'obsolete ideas' (Schumpeter, 1942, pp.131-138). However, he did a service by linking profit to productivity.
Thus rudimentary analysis could succeed in presenting only a welter of profit theories explaining at best partial truths about the emergence of profit. In fact, dynamic change in all its ramifications is the real source of profit.
Profit and Entrepreneurs: Economists have invariably regarded profit a functional return - the reward for entrepreneurial services, however, defined. Knight provides the leading example that still seems to underlie the text book view of the subject. He argued that since uncertainty breeds risk that cannot be eliminated or met at a cost, every one is not equally inclined or equipped to assume the role of decision maker in the realm of business. Only those who have confidence in their own judgment as well as the ability to put their opinion into operation, specialize in decision-making and are ready to bear the consequences. They are the entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs translate their decisions into action by hiring the other factors of production. The services of the hired factors do not involve, says Knight, the exercise of judgment in the same sense as it does in the case of the entrepreneurs (Knight, pp. 270- 72). They work for the entrepreneurs in return for their contractual payments. The objective requirement for entrepreneurship, according to Knight (pp. 198, 363-64) is the possession of property since no empty handed person can ensure contractual payments to the hired factors of production. This view of the entrepreneur makes profit the reward for making business decisions in the face of uncertainty, and is a legacy of the classical model of the tiny owner-operated business units. It fits well even today to cases of small business. But since the rise to dominance of the modern corporate form of organization both the functions and the identity of the entrepreneurs have come under heavy fire. Put briefly, the argument is follows:
The promoters bring the corporation into existence and the stockholders provide the risk capital which is often supplemented by institutional finance. The decision making function and the ownership of the organization are in quite different hands. Ordinarily those who make decisions are the salaried people and they do not bear the consequences of their decisions. Further, decision-making is divided among a large number of fairly independent functionaries all of whom may not have the same aims or motivation. Who then are the entrepreneurs and what functions do they perform in era of corporations?
One could attempt an escape out of the difficulty by saying that real control goes with responsibility. It consists in making decisions not about things but in the judgment of men's ability to do things. The exercise of this judgment - the entrepreneurial function - may be spread over the whole hierarchy of the corporate enterprise but in the ultimate analysis it lies in the hands of the owners of the organization - the stockholders [8]. After all who appoints the managers and to whom are they accountable?
Small, closely held corporations are no different from the proprietary business in this matter. In the large corporations the ownership rights of the small, widely dispersed, and unknown stockholders may have become formal, representing a mere claim to a wage' for their capital determined by the management (Means, p. 262). But the rights of the owners of large blocks of stock are real in the sense that they may often manage to acquire effective control over the affairs of their corporations. The perfection of the proxy machine and some other techniques tend to help in the emergence of 'controlownership' in the case of large corporations9. Though the control may rarely pass into the hands of a single person [10], (the possibility of a small group of stockholders enjoying such power is always there. Presumably, there is no other form of property today that people may strive to acquire with greater zest and vigor than the control over a modern corporation.
Thus the entrepreneur survives as a unit of interest and control despite the corporations, though his entity as a managerial unit may be doubted (Galbraith, pp. 70- 71). Text book economics has rightly stuck to the tradition: for with the entrepreneur goes the motivational base of the capitalistic organization run by the market forces. The advent of large corporations has only made the profits of the firm a non-functional surplus in the hands of the entrepreneurs.
In Summary: It comes about that profit defined as a surplus of business earnings over contractual payments is a non-functional surplus whose origin lies essentially in progressive dynamic change. The real issues in profit theory are (i) whether contractual payments, specially wages, as determined by the market forces. can be shown to be just and (ii) whether the utilization of the residuum in the hands of the entrepreneurs is always proper.
The marginal productivity theory of distribution is illogical and unrealistic; it fails to ensure natural justice11. Profit appropriation is largely institutional; market is no arbiter in this matter. And economic theory has chosen to stay neutral toward ends [12].
Under the circumstances no firm opinion could be ventured on either of the above mentioned issues. But Islamic economics, imbued as it is with ethical values, cannot afford escapism Let us now see what formulation in the area of profit theory can meet its approval.

Profit in the Islamic Perspective

Islam exhorts the believers to excel in this life no less than in the life hereafter. It urges them to engage in almost every material pursuit. especially trade and eulogizes profit as God's bounty13. But Islam is not unaware of man's inordinate love for wordly gains (Qur'an l00:8). So it instructs people to observe moderation in the drive for profit [14], behave in a prescribed way [15], and acquire only the legitimate, not the maximum. It advocates absolute honesty in business to the extent that one is enjoined not to falsely praise his merchandise, but to reveal to the customer [16] any defects in it.
The Islamic concept of Halal and Haram is quite adequate to keep people on the right track (Maudoodi, pp.82-89 and Hafizur Rahman, pp.63-67). In case of conflict between wealth and virtue one has to be content with whatever can be acquired rightfully even though it may be little (5:103). There are a number of Qur'anic verses and traditions that remind man of the transient nature of this world and its possessions relative to spiritual ends, and seek, by implication, to bring the pursuit of profit under Islam's moral discipline (The Qur'an: 4:77, 28:77, 29:64, 57:20-21 and elsewhere).
However, subliming the profit motive through moral persuasion, though important, is relatively a small matter. Of real significance is the scheme of distribution that seems to emerge from the Islamic notion of economic justice in the face of uncertainty shrouding the outcome of the business operations.
Norms of Justice and Uncertainty: The Islamic ideal of economic justice seems to be the achieving of a situation wherein what each factor ultimately gets is what it contributes to total output. The Qur'an explicitly declares: "God created the heaven and the earth for just ends, and in order that each soul may find the recompense of what it has earned" (45:22). Islam aims at shaping all exchange relations among people on the principle of cooperation, mutual benefit, and fair play (4:29-30). It directs men not to expose themselves or inflict on others loss that is possible to avoid [17]. This principle lies at the heart of the celebrated Islamic notion of gharar (indeterminacy, hazard).
Contractual relations must be, as far as possible gharar-free. The Prophet is reported for instance to have instructed not to sell fruits on trees until they show clear signs of maturing, or standing crops before the ears have turned golden and the danger of damage through natural calamities has reasonably passed, nor to sell things one does not possess at the time of making the contract (Ahmad, vol.2, pp. 399,403 and Rodinson, p.16). For deals such as these have the potential of causing harm to one of the parties. Little care can prevent this harm.
For the same reasons Islam may not approve the existing forms of insurance or forward trading and does not permit speculation, specially in food grains (Hifzur Rahman, pp. 260-263). Incidentally it is now being increasingly asked if unbridled speculation does more good than harm to the socio-economic fabric of the community.
A modern text book makes the observation: "The main economic role of a stock exchange is the preservation and expansion of the rentier wealth, rather than the provision of finance to industry or government". (Robinson and Eatwell, p.226).
One need not envisage the 'horror of risk' afflicting Muslim societies in the Islamic notion of gharar [18]. If at all, the real progeny of horror are the institutions of interest, limited liability, preference shares, the stock exchange escape route, etc., and these are distasteful to Islam. Gharar signifies the Islamic concern to ensure every one his rightful due in the process of production. This becomes all the more evident from the Islamic attitude towards the determination of various distribution shares - an issue to which we now turn.
The Interest Question: Barring a few discordant voices, learned opinion in the Muslim world holds, as an axiom, that the prohibition of riba is total and complete in Islam. The verdict makes no distinction between usury and interest, between its simple and compound forms, between productive and unproductive loans, or for that matter between money and commodity borrowings [19]. It is not of much relevance here to reexamine the entire argument but, the consensus being what it is, one aspect of the ban deserves further investigation. In the framework of a business firm both interest and profit are payments for the use of capital, yet interest is not allowed in Islam while profit is, why?
Islam recognizes the productive attribute of capital and does not intend to deprive it of its due reward [20]. But, to begin with, is interest commensurate with productivity? The level of interest rates is mainly determined by the state of opinion in the market for placements - the stock exchange - and manipulation of monetary policy [21]. What has the productivity of capital to do with either of them? Again, all the funds are intermixed in the asset formation of the firm and are, from its viewpoint, equally productive and exposed to the same type of risk and uncertainty in its business. How does the productivity of the borrowed and the equity parts of funds differ? Further - and this is crucial - why should the firm make different payments to capital for identical functions, one at the predetermined rate (interest) and the other (profit) variable with the results of the business operations? Financial expediency need not meet the ends of justice.
The non-symmetry clearly invokes the principle of gharar. Market economies are characterized by business fluctuations where interest rates invariably lag behind price variations. The result is that the loan- equity mix in the capital structure of the business firms proves, in general, unjust to the lenders during periods of inflation and hurts the equity holders when the economy is going down the hump. Islam obliterates the inequity by the abolition of interest so that the capital participates in the productive ventures on equal footing - the proportionate sharing of profit.
A little digression may be allowed to dispel one apprehension. Will not the millions of those people who may prefer a relatively safe, even if small, income through the lending of their savings feel hesitant, after interest is abolished, to join in bearing the risk and uncertainty of modern business? Will that not reduce savings and retard investment thus hampering economic growth? Habits of thought and experience of taste have perhaps made the utility of the interest institution so self- evident that the danger may look real. However, a little reflection is enough to remove the doubts. First, the hope for profit is presumably stronger and more enduring in men than the fear of loss, the lure of riches often overcomes safety searching timidity. Second. if some options are closed once and for all men have shown remarkable competence to adapt themselves to those that remain open. Last but not least, institutions on the pattern of the Unit Trust of India, for example. can always be evolved to offer people opportunities for indirect participation in the equity capital of business firms with hardly any risk involved. Once the transition is over, the logic of an interest - free system can indeed be shown to work for faster and more orderly economic growth [22]. But let this not detain us further.
Form of Rent: The question of private ownership of cultivable land has been among the hotly debated issues in Islamic economics [23]. Those who allow private ownership of cultivable land have a clear edge over those who do not but they continue to be divided on the issue of rent. It is agreed that the best course for a person having land in excess of what he himself uses is to give it to his landless brother for cultivation free of charge.
However, if rent is to be taken there is no consensus regarding its form. Some permit only cash rent, some only share-cropping i.e. muzara'ah and there are still others who allow both.
On balance, share-cropping is considered to be the best (Maudoodi, p.219). For the outcome of cultivation being uncertain, predetermined, absolute rent may only be a kind of riba. For example, Professor Smith writes (p. 107): ".... these religious proponents..... cannot even understand that the prohibition of interest, if taken seriously would include the prohibition of land rent and of the whole landlord system- would mean precisely the socialization of agriculture in the interest of those who labor on land" (quoted by S.M. Ahmad, p. 32). He is perfectly right in case the tenants are charged a fixed rent in cash or kind. "Here the landlord is to the same extent indifferent to the actual yield from land as the banker is to the actual return from industry or commerce". (S.M. Ahmad, p. 33).
Fixed rent may turn out to be unjust to either of the parties to the contract when the outcome of cultivation becomes known. The objection can be overcome only if the rent is settled as some reasonable proportion of the crop i.e., muzara'ah is the arrangement.
Thus it comes about that in the area of mass production where business outcome is characterized by uncertainty, the Islamic ends of justice can be met only when interest is abolished and all capital participates in profits of the enterprise on an equal basis. In manufacturing, land partakes the form of capital. But even in agriculture where land is important there is, as we have noted, strong presumption that Islam does not permit prefixed rent in cash or kind and prefers share-cropping to make the landlord-tenant relation free of gharar. These conclusions have great inferential significance for the determination of the remaining distributive share - the wage for labor.
The Wage Issue: Islam is not opposed to wage labor but it does insist that the wage contract should be an equitable one. Workers must have the fairest possible chance under the arrangement to receive their due [24], i.e., what they contribute to the value product of the firm. This also implies that payment to them is not excessive either.
The difficulty is: How can predetermined wages meet the norm of justice in the face of uncertainty? How would one justify non-symmetry in the treatment of interest and prefixed rent on the one hand and wages on the other? Why can't wages be also made in some way variable with the results of the enterprise? Or, is there some insuperable difficulty in making the scheme of such variation a part of the social arrangement independent of the market?
In the area of mass production a pre-set wage as determined by the market forces, or for that matter in any other wage is indeed no better than riba. Both are prices - one paid for the use of labor, another for the use of capital [25]. There seems to be no compelling reason why workers alone should be singled out as an exception to the sharing of the uncertainty of business outcome. It may be argued that wages cannot be negative or fall to zero; for, the workers are human beings and have to be sustained in any case [26]. True, but this requirement can be taken care of in the Islamic system by the provision of a minimum wage. Islam grants all people an equal right to livelihood. One can argue that the right to a living can be guaranteed by society whereas the wages are paid by the employer. How does the sanction for a minimum wage follow from this Islamic injunction? However, the point here is that if society takes the responsibility for maintaining its out-of-work members why can't it make obligatory on the employer to ensure at least a minimum of living to those who work for him? In any case, will it be un-Islamic if society chooses to do so? Those who may like to answer in the affirmative will have to provide valid and acceptable reasons.

Even some of the capitalist countries have minimum-wage legislation and business firms or other institutions cannot pay wages below that minimum. The argument, given at times, that the minimum wage legislation may deprive some people of work, thus increasing the burden on society does not cut much ice. Can we condone robbery because its prevention involves cost to the state?
With land being of little consequence in industry and interest banned, the distribution problem boils down to the sharing of the value product between Labor and Capital. Islam allows the capitalists to share their part of the value product among themselves only in proportion to their contributions. This is true in all cases, whether the business takes the form of mudarabah or is of one of the usual types. In return, loss would always fall on their capital. As regards the apportioning of the value product between capital on the one hand and labor on the other the use of the pre-set wages for the purpose cannot be proved to meet the ends of Islamic justice. Beyond minimum wages, presumably some sort of a labor participatory system alone can bring us closer to a distribution scheme that may be just to both labor and capital.
The above conclusion stems clearly from the first principles of Islam - the principles of equity and gharar-free contractual relations. But let me set up a supplementary argument.
An Analogy: Take the case of mudarabah where one of the partners, say A, supplies capital and the other, say B, works and uses his talent to make the investment bear fruit; both agreeing to share profits in certain proportions while A alone will bear the loss, if any. What is the intention in so framing the scheme other than the desire to be fair to both? Otherwise. why can't A employ B on fixed wages to work for him? Are not the wide spread, small, inactive shareholders in modern corporations doing just this when they leave their business to be conducted by the salaried managers? Again, if production takes time as it does and B has no means whatsoever to support himself from where will resources come to provide even a minimum of living to B during the interval if not from the funds supplied to business by A? If that is to be the source, how will it be unfair on the part of A to claim from the resulting profit before he shares it with B the money so spent? If the deduction is justified the amount becomes an element of cost.
The analogy provides further support to the inference stated earlier that distributive justice as visualized by Islam is hard to achieve without labor participation in the fruits of business. It makes clear that the entire value product minus minimum wages must be treated as profit to be apportioned between labor and capital. Mudarabah to my mind cannot be taken as just one design of business contract allowed by Islam in isolation of the logic and spirit on which it is based.
While profit sharing is a matter of principle the question of the division ratio belongs to the institutional domain. "Some Maliki jurisprudents" in case of mudarabah, for example "Went so far as to give the employee an equal share of profit. The employer provides all capital and the workman does the work. The two efforts are equal and accordingly they are entitled to equal share in profit" (Qutub, p. 135). History bears testimony that this type of relationship between capital and labor "was designed to undergo enormous expansion" in Muslim societies around the thirteenth century,(Rodinson. p. 51).

The Model: We may now formulate a macro-level model of distribution that emerges from the above discussion. Let Y be the aggregate value product of the business firms, P the profit, W the minimum wage, and T the business taxes.
Y = P +W + T (1)
Suppose P is shared between capital and labor in the k and (l - k) ratios respectively, where k is an institutional variable. We have:
Y = kP + (l - k) P + W + T (2)
However. the market wage, say W, already paid to the workers will invariably be more than the minimum wage W. Equity demands that the excess amount paid to them must be adjusted to their share of the profit (l - k) P. Equation (2) then becomes:
Y = kP + | (l-k) P - (W- W) | +W ± T (3)
Let us put | (l-k) P- (W-W) | = B, where B may be called the bonus payable to the workers. This gives us the final distribution equation conforming to the Islamic spirit and intent:
Y = kP + W+ B + T (4)
where kP is to be shared by the capitalists among themselves (W + B) goes to the workers, and T to be the state.
In the case of individual firms suffering losses B may well be negative. This may be debited to a special account to be charged (i) against the workers' future share of profit.
or (ii) to the reserves built through deductions from P prior to its distribution.
In the above model P is the net of business taxes and a mutually agreed policy of profit retention may be enforced to take care of the financial requirements of the industry.
The more inquisitive may perhaps like to ask: But what is the theory involved in the scheme of the model? It has to be pointed out that Islam does not believe in idle theorizing. It presents to the believers; a comprehensive action program (13:29). As such. the principles of Islamic economics can only be the principles of economic policy.
The above model is not afflicted with atomistic analysis of profit. The definition of P is objective and precise. Profit is viewed as a surplus that cannot be ascribed to some unique functions performed by the waning entrepreneurs. Nor does the model interfere in any way with the workings of the price mechanism; Y and W continue to be determined by the market forces. W and k are the policy variables. Islam has no objection. would indeed welcome, if the business enterprises evolve for themselves a code of conduct that includes these variables. Otherwise, the state cannot become oblivious of its responsibility in ensuring distributive justice. Even in the capitalistic economies the appropriation of profit is a matter of the firms' policy decision and governmental regulation of business affairs for safeguarding social interest has increased to an extent that the system now looks more 'managed' than 'free'.

Conclusion

The profit view presented in Part Two is in line with the fundamental Islamic principles of unity, harmony, mutual trust and cooperation, individual freedom with social responsibility and fair play. It attempts to face the issues which the capitalistic profit theory leaves open as shown at the end of Part One The two differ primarily because economic science has a positive stance while the Islamic approach to economic issues is loaded with normative considerations.
Presumably a different juxtaposition than the one presented here is difficult to erect in the light of the available literature on profit theory on the one hand, and the Islamic rationality and injunctions on the other. Nevertheless, the paper raises as many questions as it attempts to answer in the hope of stimulating, even provoking, the learned. Any improvement over this preliminary effort will be a step forward in a rather difficult area of Islamic economics.

End notes
(1) For example the Holy Qur'an prescribes the rules for inheritance (2:180,240,4:7-9, 19,33, 176; 5:109-111),
allows the individual the sale and purchase of goods (e.g. 2:188; 4:29). and condemns hoarding of wealth
(3:180; 9:34) and so on.
(2) The Qur'an permits legitimate trade even when on pilgrimage (2:198). "The merchant who is sincere and
trustworthy will on the Day of Judgment be among the prophets, the just, and the martyrs". Tirmidhi, Abwab-ul-Buyu, quoted in Hifzur Rahman.
(3) Islam rather makes it obligatory on the part of the state to intervene effectively in the economic life of the people if the larger social interest so demands. There is virtually no limit to such intervention including public ownership of property (Qur'an 3:16). takeover or nationalization, wage regulation, price control, anti-monopoly measures, trade curbs and soon. See Hifzur-Rahman, pp.8,42 and 390; Yusuf Ali, notes 510-511 on Surah 4, Verse 5, Maudoodi, p.77.
(4) Stigler, Ferguson and Watson have for example no chapters on the subject of profit.
(5) This view is shared by Mrs. Joan Robinson, Chamberlin and Schumpeter, though with some differences. However, Schumpeter at a later stage gave up the distinction between profit and monopoly revenue,treating the two as one.
(6) By no stretch of imagination is normal profit less uncertain than pure profit under dynamic conditions. It is illogical to measure normal profit by the contractual rates that are guaranteed payments. The advantage of an uncertain given income cannot be measured by the loss of the same amount.
(7) For example, J.B. Clark's static state' Frank H. Knight's version of 'perfect competition'. and J.A. Schumpeter's 'circular flow'.
(8) Indeed, Knight himself visualized the difficulty and attempted to provide an answer along these lines. (pp. 291-300).
(9) "As is well known, the widespread diffusion of stock ownership and the development of the proxy machine, have operated to remove the stockholder from significant control over the corporate enterprise. At the same time it has, as a practical matter, placed ultimate control over the enterprise in the hinds of a management which owns only a small fraction of the outstanding stock", (Means. p. 254).
(10) Even in a corporation where stock holdings are widely spread "at a certain stage of growth.... power is concentrated in some one who exercises command over the enterprise. Thus appears in classical form the figure of the entrepreneur". (Galbraith, 1968, pp. 87,89 passim).
(11) "It is not true that a system in which each factor receives an income equal to its marginal product corresponds to some kind of natural justice according to which what each factor gets is what it contributes to total output (because) it is not its productivity but its scarcity relative to the other factors that determines the marginal productivity of each." (Robinson and Fatwell, p.88).
(12) Some economists consider this so important as to express the fact in the very title of their book, e.g., Lipsey
(13) The Qur'an: (2:198, 62:10, 73:20 and elsewhere). A tradition says: "If you profit by doing what is prescribed, your deed is a Jihad (i.e., equivalent to fighting or any other vigorous effort in the service of God's Cause).... and truly a dirham lawfully gained from trade is worth more than ten dirhams gained in any other way" Quoted (from Zaid Ibn Ali 'Corpus juris'.... ed. E. Griffini, Milan, 1919, n. 589) in Rodinson, pp.16-17.
(14) The Prophet - peace be on him - is reported to have said: "Fear God and be moderate in your pursuit of wealth take only that which is allowed and leave that which is forbidden". Ibn Majah Vol 2, p.725: 2144.
(15) Islam forbids practices that are fraudulent in one way or the other, together with trade in things it considers impure like wine, pigs, animals that have not been properly slaughtered. and also in goods that are regarded as common to all i.e., water, fire, grass. It insists on having proper weights and measures, and on their correct use(11:84, 17:35, 26:181-183, 57:25, 83:1-4).
(16) See for example Ghazali pp 68 and passim, quoted in M. Rodinson, p.251 note 24: Maudoodi, pp.82-89 and Hifzur Rahman. pp.63-67.
(17) According to tradition the guiding principle in all matters is: "no injury (deliberate or otherwise) and no reprisal" (quoted by Hifzur Rahman, p.210).
(18) For one such interpretation see for example Rodinson, pp. 161-163, where he quotes a number of writers without rhythm or direction, in his argument which is even self-canceling at places.
(19) For an argument along these lines see, for instance, Sheikh Mahmood Ahmad, Ch. 11 on interest. Further. see Qureshi. Ch. 2 entitled: "Islamic Theory of Interest".
(20) Otherwise, Islam would not have allowed mudarabah as a form of business organization.
(21) Robinson and Eatwell. p. 281). They do not regard the rate of profit on capital as well as related to the productivity of capital. This rate, they hold-and rightly so depends broadly on the state of technology and the lever real wages.
(22) At least to the extent that Keynes has held interest to be a hindrance to both. See his General Theory, pp.
136, 137, 140, 144, 145, 322 and 323 taken together help make a clear argument.
(23) For arguments in favor of private ownership in land see for example, Maudoodi, pp.189-219 and Zafar Ahmad Usmani. Vol.71 Nos. 4 and 5 (April, May. 1953). pp. 245-286 and 325-340 respectively. For the opposite viewpoint see, for instance, Nasir Ahmad Sheikh. and Syed Manazir Gilani. Vol. 70 no.6. (December, 1952) pp. 405-422, and Vol.71 (Jan., 1953) pp.5-22. The articles by Usmani are a rejoinder to those of Gilani.
(24) This follows from the tradition which says, "Three persons are sure to incur God's displeasure on the Day of Judgment... and one who engages a worker to do a job, takes full work out of him but does not pay him his due wages" Bukhari ( Ibn Hajar: Fath-al-Bari. Kitab al-'ijarah).
(25) A similar question is raised for example by Wadi A. Kabli. See Zarqa, p. 7.
(26) Zarqa in the note quoted above gives reasons as to why does Islam permit pre-fixed wages for labor but not a fixed payment (interest) for capital. And this is one of his reasons. My argument below does not negate what he says, nor does it oppose market wage. What it insists on is the adjustment in payment to a just reward to capital as well - when the result of the enterprise in the area of mass production becomes known. The scheme designed here checks the capitalist's temptation to exploit the worker for his gain but at the same time it does not permit the workers to run away with their fixed wages without observing their responsibilities in production - mark the (W - W) adjustment in the model presented in the following sections.


References

Ahmad, Sheikh Mahmoud. Economics of Islam. Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i-Delhi.
Ali, Yusuf. Glorious Qur'an. New York: Massachusettes Murray Printing Company for Hafner Publishing Company.
Ferguson, C.E. Micro Economics, Irwin: 1969.
Galbraith, J.K. The New Industrial State. New York, 1969.
Gazali, Abu Hamid. Ihya ulumal-Din, Cairo, 1933, Vol.2.
Hassan, Zubair. Theory' of Profit, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975.
Hifzur Rahman. Islam ka Iqtesadi Nizam. Delhi: Nadwat-ul Musennifin Jama Masjid, Sixth
edition, 1969.
Keynes, J.M. General Theory' of Employment, Interest & Money. London: Mac-Millan, 1957.
Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York: 1957.
Lipsey, R.G. An Introduction to Positive Economics:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980.
Maudoodi, Sayyid Abul'Ala. Maashyat-e-Islam (Urdu), Khurshid Ahmad (ed.), Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1977.
Means, Gardiner C. Pricing Power and Public Interest, New York; 1962.
Qureshi, Anwar Iqbal. The Theory of Interest. Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i-Delhi.
Qutb, Muhammad. Islam, The Misunderstood Religion, Kuwait; Darul Bayan Bookshop.
Robinson, Joan and Eatwell, John. An Introduction to Modern Economics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1973.
Rodinson, Maxime. Islamand Capitalism. London: Allan Lane, 1974.
Sheikh, Nasir Ahmad. Some Aspect of the Constitution and Economics of Islam, Woking, England: The WokingMission and Library Trust, 1967.
Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 942, 2nd ed.
Schumpeter, J. A. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge; Harvard University Press.
Smith, W.C. Modern Islamin India. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1969.
Stigler, George J. The Theory of Price. London: Mac-Millan, 1971.
Gilani, Syed Manazir. "Nizam-e-Jagirdari-o-Zamindari ki Islam Mein kiya Gunjaesh Hai",
Ma`arif, Azamgarh, Vol.70, No.6, Dec. 1952 and Vol.71, Jan. 1953.
Usmani, Zafar Ahmad. "IslamMein Jagirdari ka Nizam" (Urdu). Ma'arif, Azamgarh, April, May, 1953.
Watson, D.S. Price Theory and Its Uses, 1961.
Wetson, J.F. "The Profit Concept and Theory, a Restatement", Journal of Political Economy, April, 1954.
Zarqa, M. Anas. "Tasa `ulat Hawla al Fa'ida wa al Riba", Al-Madina, Feb., 9, 1982.

Sources : Res. Islamic Econ., Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 3-14 (1403/1983)

ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF NIZAM AL-MULIK AL-TUSI

Brief Life History

Khwajah Abu Ali Hasan Ibn Ali Ishaq was a landmark figure of the history and rule of the Saljuq Turks, who established their Sultanate in the name of the caliphs of Baghdad. He is better known.in history as Nizam al-Mulk, a title of honor, conferred upon him by the founder of the Saljuq dynasty, Sultan Alp Arslan.

It was in 408 AH/IO17 AD that Nizam al-Mulk was born, in the small town of Radhkan (or Nuqan?) located in the suburb of Tus, about 50 miles to the north of Mashhad in Persia. He belonged to a family of middle-class landowners (dihqans) and in the days of the Ghaznawids, his father was appointed a tax-collector of Tus by Abu al-Fadl Sun, the governor of Khurasan.
Nizam al-Mulk had his early education in the study of Hadith and fiqh. Upon his father's desire to see him pursuing the legal profession, he was initially placed under the guidance of 'Abd al-Samad Funduraji, a profound scholar of law. He then studied with an outstanding Shafi'i 'alim known as Iman Muwaffaq of Nishapur. This would probably be the main reason for his allegiance to the Shafi'i madzhab, as apparent in his (Nizam al-Mulk's) major work, Siyasat Namah. After his studies, Nizam al-Mulk, although being a Persian, was to begin his gradual and eventual, but initially unplanned, administrative mastery of the Turkish Saljuq empire.

". ..he travelled to Bukhara and Merv, and to a number of towns in Transoxiana, most probably in search of a post, and after 441 AH /1049 AD, he went to Ghaznah, where he sought service with the Ghaznawids, thus getting an opportunity to acquaint himself with their administration. When Sultan Abd al-Rashid was murdered in 444 AH /1052 AD and the political affairs were upset, he escaped to Balkh and entered the service of Ali Ibn Shadhan, who was then the governor of that province on behalf of the Saljuq ruler Chaghari Beg Dawud. Annoyed with the habits of this man, who extorted heavy sums from him every year, he fled to Merv; there Chaghari Beg appointed him the mushir (counsellor) and the katib (secretary) of his son, Alp Arslan. It was on the advice of~li Ibn Shadhan that Alp Arslan, after his accession to the throne in 455 AH /1062 AD, raised him to the position of a Joint Minister with Amidal-Mulk Kunduri."

After the death of Kunduri, Nizam al-Mulk became a full-fledged prime IIlinister or wazir of the Saljuq empire. He held the reins of the empire during the rules of Alp Arslan and his successor-son, Malik Shah, especially during the rule of the latter who succeeded to the throne in 465 AH/I072 AD.

The period of Nizam al-Mulk's life and Prime Ministership has been, labelled as a period of change. "... (it was a period of) a great conflict between the accepted ideas of Islamic policy and the Perso-Turkish notions which were slowly creeping into the body-politic of the Caliphate. The Islamic principle of political conduct was that the ruler should not be a super-legal person free to act as he willed, but that he should definitely and without doubt be under the Divine Law as laid down by the Apostle of Islam. Circumstances had, no doubt, changed since this great principle was laid down, and the shifting of the capital from Madinah to Damascus and from Damascus to Baghdad had made the Caliphate an absolute monarchy in all but name. While Iranian culture and principles attacked the sanctuary of Baghdad in the west, it converted the nomadic Turks of Central Asia in the east to their own way of thought, and when the Seljuqis reached the centre of the Caliphate they had already become thoroughly Persians."

The ability to ride this period, and as prime administrator for 30 years, to organise the empire and establish peace and prosperity, stamped the administration of Nizam al-Mulk as the period of the Golden Age for the Saljuq rule.

"He organized a system of education and started regular madrasahs I and founded several important colleges and universities and endowed them adequately with magnificent grants from the government. He selected the best qualified men and employed them as heads of colleges. Among these were Imam Ghazali and Imam al-Haramain at Nishapur, al-Shashi at Herat and Abu-Ishaq Shirazi at Baghdad. Tajud-Doula, another minister of Seljukid, founded a college under his name Tajiyya, and Nizam al-Mulk's other colleges were at Isfahan and Mery, which possessed 10 public libraries. Besides these, there were other colleges in all important cities, such as Samarkand, Balkh, Alleppo, Damascus, Ghazni and even Lahore. To these, the Khalifah Mustans'er added a magnificent college with library and other arrangements under the name of Mustansariyyah. There were 30 high schools in Alexandria and 17 centres of learning in Spain with 70 public libraries. Spanish Muslims were'so eager for education that from the Khalifah down to the poorest citizen, all were united in studying and undertaking the long journey in quest of knowledge. There were colleges, academies and libraries at Seville, Granada and Cordova. The last-named, possessed besides a most magnificent library, a college which produced over 170 eminent scholars."

Nizam al-Mulk's commitment to education was not solely restricted to the setting up of education institutions. Every effort was made to facilitate the search for knowledge through disbursement of scholarships, supplies of books, lodging, boarding and any other necessities, much of which were borne by the ruler.

Nizam al-Mulk's administrative acumen also brought progress to the infrastructural and economic development of the empire. Roads were built while taxes were appropriated. Land policies and matters received hisexpert attention since he had first-hand knowledge of all administrative affairs, especially those relating to land. As we are to discuss later, this was one of the more important economic affairs that he had significantly contributed to.

It is thus not surprising to read of various awards of recognition conferred upon this scholar by both Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. The Abbasid Caliph, al-Qa'im (1030-1075 AD), dignified him with the title of Radi-u Amir al-Mu'minin, an award never before conferred on a wazir. Malik Shah awarded him the high title of Atabek (literally meaning "Father Lord") for successfully meeting various threats and difficulties facing the former's rule.

As fate was to show, there were those who felt threatened by the administrative vigour and leadership of Nizam al-Mulk. The Ismailis ultimately acted against him through assassination because he opposed them on religious grounds and threatened their dangerous political designs. It was even stated that the period of glory for the Saljuqs ended with his death.

Major Works

Nizam al-Mulk has been reported as having three works to his credit, at least in terms of the ideas having originated from him even though he may not have been the one to write it wholly.

These three works are:

1. Siyasat Namah (The Book of Government/Statecraft), also known as Siyaru al-Muluk.

2. Dastur al- Wuzara' (The Conduct of Ministers) or also known as the Wasaya-i Khwajah Nizam al-Mulk (The Precepts of Khwajah Nizam al-Mulk). This book is henceforth referred to as the Wasaya. Some references refer this work as the Majma'u al-Wasaya.

3. Safar Namah (The Book of Travels), reported to be no more in existence.

On the first two works, the Wasaya is accompanied with some controversies pertaining to the question of whether it was indeed Nizam al-Mulk who wrote it.

"The Wasaya is not claimed to be the composition of Nizam al-Mulk himself in the sense in which the Siyasat Namah is considered to be his work. It was compiled in the ninth / fifteenth century by an anonymous person whose family, as he claims in the preface, descended from Nizam al-Mulk. He compiled it partly from the books and partly from the oral traditions handed down in his own family. Therefore, the anecdotes cited in it begin invariably with the phrase, "So says Khwajah Nizam al-Mulk." The preface, which is one of the reliable sources of Nizam al-Mulk's life, is evidently from the pen of the compiler. But the other two chapters, which form the main part of the work and contain much valuable material on the political ideas of this famous vizier, are composed from his own authentic writings and utterances. It has been justly remarked that it does not owe its contents to his pen. A large part of the Wasaya may be regarded as the actual utterances of Nizam al-Mulk."

With regards to its contents, the Wasaya is said to be an exposition of his theory of vizierate, or prime ministership, a mind-penetrating and powerful model of governmentship, which has much to lend to students of public administration and political science.

The Siyasat Namah has generally been recognized as the genuine composition of Nizam al-Mulk. It was a product of Malik Shah's instruction to his ministers to explain the cause of troubles affecting the nation. The ministers, including Sharaf al-Mulk, Taj al-Mulk, Majd al-Mulk and Nizam al-Mulk attempted to produce books on politics and administration. However, only Nizam al-Mulk's Siyasat Namah met with his approval, leading to Malik Shah declaring that it would form the law of the constitution of the nation in future.

This book itself contains 50 chapters, spreading over the tasks of identifying the factors of political success, royal prerogatives, duties along with the administration of every department of the government, the way for a state to attain stability and what could be the main requirements of the Saljuqian Empire. In short, this book details the plan of running a government successfully.

The significance of this book is such that "the main principles enunciated by it still guide nations and rulers in their relations with one another and in their domestic affairs." This is perhaps attributed to the high degree of pragmatism and viability inherent in the ideas propagated because the book is "an expression of a realistic political theory which emerges out of an actual political situation, and, therefore, help us to understand the stage the development of Muslim polity reached in the 5th century AH / 11th century AD." Thus, there exist a strong cohesion and cogent embodiment between theory and practice, partly arising out of the position of Nizam al-Mulk as a real-life statesman.

Administrative and Economic Outlook

Nature and Basic of the Government/State

Nizam al-Mulk conceived the state as a moral institution, ruled to attain good for the millah (nation/people). However, the state itself must be good and to be so, it must be founded on the values and principles of Islam, embodied as the Islamic Shari'ah. The nature of the Shari'ah is such that it does not dichotomies between the "religious" and "mundane" functions of the state. Hence, preservation of the material and mundane interests (such as property, welfare and equity) are as much Islamic objectives as the preservation of "religious" duties. Being a prime statesman involved in real life administration, Nizam al-Mulk strove towards transforming the ideals inherent in Islam into practical realities, an effort which had rewarded him with the attribute of being one who does not merely theorize, but rather, translate theories into pragmatism.

Principle of Masiahah in Administration

A wise and able statesman is one who meticulously weighs all arguments and considerations to a matter. The principle of maslahah (public interest) in Islam plays a significant pivotal role in this matter, as how Nizam al-Mulk is reported to have realised.

"If any short term interests came into conflict with moral principles on the one hand and the well-being of a larger entity or community on the other, he (Nizam al-Mulk) sacrificed the short-term gains. Nizam al-Mulk invariably sought to ensure a conformity and compatibility between the interests that he was employed to safeguard and those that he had to serve in conscience as an orthodox faithful Muslim."

Safeguarding Welfare, Productivity and Efficiency

Nizam al-Mulk was fully aware of the correlation of the three factors: welfare, productivity and efficiency. Safeguarding of welfare can substantially enhance expected productivity and level of efficiency (in the general sense of the word). We can observe this through the incident related below:

"There was a time when the affairs of Ray were causing worry to Nizam al-Mulk. He was informed by spies that Qutlumush had left the fortress of Kurd Kuh and started plundering the country and soon Ray was to be attacked. Alp Arslan also started towards Nishapur and he and his army reached Damghan. Alp Arslan, compelled by his brotherly affection, sent a message to Qutlumush to desist from mischief. Qutlumush did not pay any attention and started looting the area around Ray. Qutlumush filled Wadi al-Milh with water making a passage to Ray impossible. This situation worried Alp Arslan. Nizam al-Mulk said to him, "Do not worry at all. I have recruited soldiers whose shots never miss the targets. I have secured the loyalty of pious recites of the Holy Qur'an, the ulama and the sufis of Khurasan, whom I have treated with kindness and magnanimity. All of them are praying for the victory of the Sultan. This army of yours is your best support"

After saying this, he put on his armour, proceeded with Alp Arslan and distributed money to' the troops. The Sultan put his horse in the water and crossed it safe and sound along with the army. Then severe fighting started between Qutlumush and Alp Arslan in which Qutlumush was killed. When the Sultan returned to Ray in 456AH/IO63 AD, 'Amid al-Mulk welcomed him with full military honors. On this clear and decisive victory, Alp Arslan was greatly pleased with Nizam al-Mulk".

What this incident illustrates is that force, strictness and discipline must unconditionally be accompanied with the safeguarding of the human interests. Non-quantifiable and non-material factors such as kindness and .; magnanimity are as significant, if not more, than the quantifiable factors ! such as strength and volume of resources (in this case, the size of the army). It is well advised that this point should be seriously reflected upon by policy makers when evaluating the effectiveness and acceptability of their policies. If failures in economic policies arise, the question may be posed as to whether these failures are due to deficiency in resources or the discontentment over welfare interests of the policy implementers. As a general observation, strikes and work to rule practices emerge from unsatisfactory schemes of services. Similar observations may be made of the behavior of the other economic agents of the economy.

Relationship between Satisfaction of Basic Needs and National Stability

National Stability

National stability can be attained through ensuring that the basic needs of the society are sufficiently safeguarded and satisfied. Further enhancement can almost ensure the minimization of possible reasons for grievances that may be harbored against the ruler.
"Food should be plentiful and the state should organize free kitchens for the needy and the poor. The agricultural produce should be kept up so that there is no shortage of foodstuffs. State granaries should be maintained in the Empire to provide plentiful foodstuffs during natural calamities or bad harvests. Hoarding and cornering of necessities must be stopped and punished. The market is to be controlled in the interests of the consumer".

Need for Cautious Economising Measures

Managing the economic components of a state cannot be divorced from considering possible repercussions (desired or otherwise) affecting the other sectors of a nation. Nizam al-Mulk portrayed the quality of a national administrator, proving his far-sightedness in the following event:

"Malik Shah seems to have been persuaded by the argument, so he spoke to Nizam al-Mulk about the matter. He at once guessed that his opponents had been at work. He pointed out that if such a large number of men were dismissed, they would raise difficulties for the government. Besides, a large and expanding empire needed a large army. If the army was permitted to be reduced, the empire would shrink. Any person who recommended an economy of that kind was not a friend, for armies brought treasures and retrenchment of the armed forces was the surest method of losing territory as well as money. This argument settled the matter".

Hence, short-term, medium-term and long-term considerations must be appropriately weighted, so that the net consequences over a suitable time period will be to one's favor, instead of merely attaining favorable effects over the short-run period and ultimately suffering henceforth.

Optimal Employment of Labor vis-à-vis National Security

Optimal employment of labor is not only a matter of concern necessitating only considerations of economic variables. Non-economic variables are as equally important, if not more. Hence, economic policies and measures must be viewed in a comprehensive framework of considerations, one of which is national security, as portrayed by the following concern of Nizam al-Mulk.

"An unnecessary multiplication of posts and officers not only burdens the treasury but works against efficiency. If several persons share duties, the chances are that they would intrigue against each other and create complications and difficulties. It may be useful to shorten tenures of offices and rotate those holding them so that they do not become so well entrenched as to be in a position to intrigue against the monarch and create other difficulties. This is even more relevant in the case of provincial governors because if they become rooted in one place, the temptation to break away from central authority is very great".

Socio-Economic Equality

Nizam al-Mulk believed in the Islamic principle of equality, whereby everyone in the state, irrespective of status or power, shall receive equal opportunities. Equality in economic opportunities is a prerequisite for the attainment of social equality. The state or government bears the main responsibility of ensuring this. Socio-economic efforts towards this end included an effective management of zakah, large scale distribution of alms and gifts, building of inns and houses for the poor and employment provision for the people according to the capacity and worth.

Significance of the Need for a Just Tax System

No one can deny the need for a sound tax system and subsequently a healthy financial base. Nevertheless, Nizam al-Mulk believed that strong finance alone will not prevent national problems. As the following event is to illustrate, it was the nature of economic management rather than the volume of economic proceeds that was to play the pivotal role in eradicating a potential national health security threat:

"Once, Sultan Alp Arslan was about to move for an expedition against the Byzantine Empire. He, therefore, wanted to realize taxes in advance. The harvest time was a bit away and, therefore, the people were worried. Moreover, there was a plague in Merv which was taking a heavy toll of lives. One day, these happenings were discussed in the court. The Sultan said that neither the army nor money could prevent death. Nizam al-Mulk respectfully replied that only justice and benevolence could eradicate the plague. "I have read in the books of history," said he, "that a King wanted to know the exact position, of his treasury." Nobody knew his intention. The ministers of the empire very carefully verified and reported the correct position of the treasury to the King. After being informed of the sound position of the treasury, the King called upon all the officials of the state and thanked God in the presence of all of them and said that the position of the treasury was satisfactory and could meet any eventuality. "I promise that from now onward, nobody would be put to the trouble of the payment of taxes so long as the treasury is full. It will now be the duty of the officers to assure that even the weakest person is not oppressed by anyone even slightly." As a result, no death occurred during the next six years. It was quite manifest that the produce of the country had tremendously increased and people had prospered". After hearing this story, Sultan Alp Arslan cancelled his previous orders and met the requirements of I' the army from the treasury. It is obvious that if the Sultan had persisted in his design, the result would have been gross dissatisfaction, misery and failure of the scheme".

Land Policies

One of the major set of reforms developed by Nizam al-Mulk pertained to the administration of land. Several thought-provoking ideas were projected, drawing attention, supportive or otherwise, to the matter, even till today. Before venturing into some discussion of the more salient aspects of the reforms, we can perhaps read the following account of these land policies, as reported by M. Ruknuddin Hassan.

"The system of land assignment what Nizam al-Mulk calls the iqta' dari -may be regarded undoubtedly as the eastern form of feudalism as against the feudalism of medieval Europe. To a great extent, Nizam al-Mulk may be considered responsible for developing, if not for introducing, it on systematic lines within the political structure of the Saljuq empire. It was due to the military organization of the Saljuqs, on which their political structure ultimately came to rest, together with the problems of revenue administration, that the practice of assigning fiefs (iqta's) to the military chiefs, soldiers, and to other private persons was adopted. There were also the dihqans, the Old Persian land-owners, who continued to exercise proprietary rights as before. This system, in brief, was designed as a means of paying the soldiers and of collecting the revenues.

The principles on which Nizam al-Mulk suggests that the iqta' dari should be based, developed it into a feudal system very different from the western feudalism, both in character and in social and political consequences. It is basically different in the tenure of the feudatories, in their legal rights over the land and the ra'iyyah (vassals) as well as in the relation of the king as the overlord with the muqta's (feudatories), on the one hand, and with the subjects, on the other. The iqta' system, as envisaged by Nizam al-Mulk, is by no means strictly hereditary as a general rule. There is nothing in his writing to suggest that he is in favor of assigning lands to an individual with a specified legal right to transmit it by inheritance. On the other hand, , in his system, the feudatories come to occupy a position more akin to that of the tax-collectors with large administrative powers than that of the "feudal lords", in the medie6al sense. In their relations with the vassals, they are like the shihnahs (guards), and in case a feudatory fails to treat them well, "the fief, it is suggested, must be withdrawn from him". Besides, "the officials and the feudatories must be changed every two or three years so that they may not get strong in their fortifications".

It appears that side by side with developing the iqta' system, Nizam al-Mulk attempts to enlarge the powers of the king as a means of checking the centrifugal tendencies which tend to appear in feudalism. This leads him to put forward a theory of ownership which goes well with his idea of absolute monarchy. He holds that "the feudatories who hold the fiefs must know that they have no other right over the subjects than to extract from them with civility and courtesy the lawful amount which has been assigned to them, that is, to the feudatories, and when that has been taken, the subjects shall be secure in their persons, property, wives, and children, and in their goods and estates. The king, and the feudatories and the governors (walis), set over their head, are like the guards to the subjects, as the king is to others".

In entertaining such a view regarding land-ownership, Nizam al-Mulk departs from what may be regarded as the Islamic theory, which attributes the absolute ownership of land, not to the Head of the State, but to the state itself, as entrusted to it by God. It is also a clear departure from the traditional concept of the Ghuzz tribes, who looked upon the land that they would come to occupy as the common property of their families. It was this tribal concept of land-ownership that Nizam al-Mulk was seeking to modify basically, as it was out of tune with the administrative principle of a centralized empire which had now passed into their hands. To him, it was essential to bring both the land and the subjects under the central authority of the king.

A good deal of his theory, it appears, has come to him from the old feudal Persia. This is evident from his attempt to explain this principle by an anecdote from Persian history in which the famous vizier Buzurjmihr has been represented as advising Nushirwan that "the kingdom (wilayah) belongs to the king (malik), and the king has entrusted the dominion, and not the subjects, to the military. When the military is not well wishing unto the kingdom and kind to the people and takes the power to arrest and imprison and to appoint and dismiss, what difference then remains between the king and the military, for that power really belongs to the king and not to the military". On other occasions, Nushirwan exhorts his feudatories to treat the people well, and only to take from them what is due and just; and he stresses the fact that the dominion belongs to him, and it is by him that the estates have been assigned to them. Nizam al-Mulk's feudal theory takes away much of the powers from the hands of feudal lords which they enjoyed, for instance, as in western feudalism. It leaves them with limited power to collect the revenues and to have only "a fixed amount in their hands". Moreover, it removes them from the position of being the sole intermediaries between the king and the subjects, preventing the latter from getting into direct contact with the former. In his system, the direct responsibility for the well-being of the subjects rests, not with the feudatories, but with the king, and therefore, he suggests that the king should send spies (jasusan) and special confidants (khwas) to inquire secretly about administration in the fiefs in order to get reliable information about the condition of the subjects, and urges him to dismiss a feudatory who forbids subjects to represent their cases to the king in order to seek redress for grievances.

All this results in the concentration of all the political and administrative powers, as sought by Nizam al-Mulk, in the central authority of the king which was once enjoyed by the Persian autocrat."

One clear point of controversy raised by Hassan here pertains to what he perceived to be Nizam al-Mulk's alleged departure from an Islamic theory to land ownership. M.N. Siddiqi (1982) is in agreement with this view, stating that "Hassan rightly criticises this view (of Nizam al-Mulk) for being at variance with the Islamic principle, that it was the state and not the head of the state to which the land belonged". This issue should perhaps be addressed by asking the question: In the Islamic framework, are the state and the head of state to be seen as different entities, or rather, to be viewed as two sides of the same coin, one being the body itself while the other is a representative of that body? The discrepancy would arise if the state (as a whole) is unIslamically and unjustifiably at variance with the leader, at which stage, either the state or the ruler must be brought back in line to the Islamic path. This realignment should then be sufficient cause for placing aside any conception that the state and the ruler can contradict each other in objectives, approach and principles. For an enhanced appreciation of this matter, the next section on the attributes of a ruler should be read closely in context.

Siddiqi also wrote: "He (Nizam al-Mulk) recommended withdrawing land from the charge of the landlord if he failed to fulfil his obligations. The landlords were, in his (Nizam al-Mulk's) viezp, only tax collectors. They did not even have the right to fix the quantum of the tax, which was the privilege of the landlords and make the ruler all powerful.

The first question that one would be provoked to question here is: what could have been the reason(s) for this policy? The question of maslahah? The problem of non-optimal or sub-optimal utilisation of land, affecting the national coffers negatively? The circumstances of the time necessitating such measures for national security reasons in view of potential hazards of disloyalty from the difficult job of managing such a large empire? These and several other possible reasons should be explored and exhausted in order to give a fair analysis of Nizam al-Mulk's actions, improper as it may initially seem to be.

Attributes of the Head of State

The ruler or the Head of state is not a figurehead. Rather, his integrity, credibility, effectiveness and just holding of this leadership duty necessitate him to unconditionally possess or vigorously strive towards the following attributes:

". ..a comely appearance, a pleasing disposition, integrity, manliness, daring skill in horsemanship, knowledge of and expertise in the use of various kinds of arms and accomplishment in different arts, pity and mercy upon the creatures of God, strictness in the performance of promises, sound faith and true belief, devotion to the worship of God and the practice of such virtuous deeds as praying in the night, (that is, in addition to the prescribed times of fard prayer) abundant fasting, respect for religious authorities, honoring devout and pious men, winning the society of men of learning and wisdom, giving regular alms, doing good to the poor, being kind to subordinates and servants, and relieving the people from their oppressors".

One fact that had been impressed upon him was the highly exemplary characteristic of past Persian rulers, who allowed them to be judged in courts if complaints were made against them by the people. As a Muslim, Nizam al-Mulk believed that taqwa (piety) can lead to this willingness, committed in all sincerity. Hence, the ruler must not only qualitatively develop himself but close avenues that could lead to opposing objectives (That is evil).
"Hence (the ruler) should make every effort to become popular through his service to the people because on the support of the people would lie his real strength. He must guard himself against becoming a tyrant. The best method of doing so is to cultivate piety and respect for the Shari'ah because so long as he follows the law he cannot incline towards tyranny as the Shari'ah prescribes excellent limits of authority and its exercise.

He should make every effort to enforce justice not only among the people at large but also to punish wrongdoers and oppressors among his officials who should not be permitted to exceed their legitimate authority.

He should keep good company and cultivate the society of men who give him sound advice. For this, he has to cultivate a good judgment, because without a sound judgment, he can neither be a good judge of men, nor of their motives, nor of the quality of the advice that they tender".

The Nature, Role and Control of Public Servants

Nizam al-Mulk believed that the Head of State as conditioned in the preceding section, must necessarily be supported by an equally strong supporting set of public servants. Besides qualitatively developing these public servants, preventive measures to ensure the safeguarding of these public servants must be established. Hence, the need for a proper system of checks and balances so that abuse of public authority will not occur.

"The monarch should be in a position to enforce obedience to his orders and if orders are not obeyed and discipline is undermined among the public servants or any other sector of the subjects, the stability of the state would be threatened. In fact, the power to enforce obedience is the real bastion of the strength of the state. The public servants being of such importance for the efficiency of the government and the stability of the state should be chosen carefully. It has already been mentioned that the utmost vigilance should be exercised in preventing heretics, unbelievers or disloyal persons infiltrating into the service, because their main motive would be to disrupt the state or at least they would become willing agents of disloyal and hostile elements.
In choosing the public servants their merit as governed by right belief and loyalty is to be kept in view. Their capacity for good and efficient service should form a yardstick. From this, it follows that efficiency would suffer greatly if worthless favorites or their recommendees are recruited or promoted. This will also enable him to keep an eye upon traitors and treacherous activities. The Sultan would then be forewarned and thus forearmed and quite often be able to nip the mischief in the bud".

It need not be extensively argued here of the significance of this issue. Misappropriation of funds, abuse of power, authority and status, criminal and civil breaches of trusts, corruption and white-collar crimes are reflective of societies which neglect this obvious fact. Economically and less-economically developed nations of today commonly face this dilemma. It is just the differing degrees of occurrences and their subtleties which may cause one nation's plight to be more highlighted than the others'.

M.R. Hassan rightly highlighted Nizam al-Mulk's emphasis on the quality of responsibilities towards the people when he wrote of Nizam al-Mulk as arguing that:

". ..a good monarch must rule, not for his own good, but for the good office whole country. He is responsible for the welfare of his subjects, and is personally accountable to God, not only for his own conduct, but also for the conduct of his officials towards the people. It is, therefore, an essential part of his duty that he should appoint as government officers only those who are God-fearing, learned, pious, and righteous, and should instruct them to treat the people well, because as justice brings prosperity, oppression leads to the devastation of a country".

The Role and Attributes of the Muhtasib

Focusing on the market economy itself, Nizam al-Mulk wrote of the role of the muhtasib. Again, where heavy responsibilities are to be shouldered necessitating inherent qualities of trustworthiness, accountability, reliability and piety, then those to be appointed into the post of a muhtasib must necessarily be men of high integrity. To be able to ensure a law-abiding and contented society is of prime prerequisite for national stability and peace, conditions conducive for the further development of the society.

The less-to-do section of the population was extended special attention because even the poor could be potential rebels if their discontentment and patience were pushed too far.
"The peasantry is to be specially looked after and all help should be extended to it. Besides, it should be effectively protected from the mischief of corrupt collectors of revenue, who should not be permitted to extort any money from the cultivators. All public spending must be directed towards common good and it should be remembered that the treasury really belongs to the people".

Public Complaints Court

Nizam al-Mulk was very much impressed and partly inspired by the ancient Persian kings' methods of the administration of justice. The principle of direct responsibility adhered to by some of the more well-known kings such as Nushirwan the Just, reached the extent whereby the kings allowed themselves to be respondents before the Chief Justice. This is to allow the possibility of people who may have complaints against even the ruler.

Hence, Nizam al-Mulk advocated for the necessary holding of a public complaints court, presided by the ruler himself. Such a court must, without fail, be held twice a week to exact redress from the unjust, to dispense justice and to allow the people to have direct access to the ruler himself for such serious matters, rather than to restrict them to the use of an intermediary.

Correcting the Misconception of Nizam al-Mulk as a Persian Nationalist

Nizam al-Mulk have been implicated as a person "serving the cause of Persian nationalism". It cannot be denied that in many matters, he had looked into his Persian heritage. This included among others, his concern for the administration of justice by the ruler and several aspects of his land policies.

However, it must be noted that he was a devout Muslim statesman with a firm Islamic conviction. This is clear without further proving. Even as he advocated the various aspects of land policies, justice system and others, he adhered to the Islamic value pattern and principles to extract the Islamically acceptable features of the Persian heritage. Furthermore, "as the Muslim administrative tradition in the East had adapted many institutions and procedures from pre-Islamic Iranian traditions, their influences can surely be traced in Nizam al-Mulk's thought; but that is a far cry from saying that he was serving the cause of Persian nationalism". Indeed, even in the Shari'ah matters and views on administration and statecraft and framework, it can safely be stated that he followed the opinions of Muslim fuqaha such as al-Mawardi. What he had done was to apply both the Islamically -acceptable aspects of the Persian heritage and the conceptual writings of 'ulama in the manner which he thought was best for the society contemporary to his time.